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IN THE

SUPREME COURT
OF THE

STATE OF UTAH
PHIL L. HANSEN, Attorney General
of the State of Utah,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
HUGHES BROCKBANK; WALLACE H. GARDNER; MERRILL
JENKINS; ERNEST G. MANTES;
HOWARD C. NIELSON; LORIN N.
PAC E ; D. LEON REESE; and
LARRY REGIS, JR., individually
and as members of the Thirty Seventh Utah State Legislature and its
Joint Budget-Audit Committee,
Defendants nnd Appellants.

W.

Case No.
11904

APPELLANT'S BRIEF
NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an action that was brought by the Attorney
General of the State of Utah, seeking to have declared
unconstitutional the pro\·isions of Section 36-6-9, Utah Code
Annotated 1953. This section provided that members of
the Joint Budget-Audit Committee of the Utah State Legislature \n1·e to receive a per diem payment of $25.00 per
day and reimbursement for actual and necessary expenses
incurred while attending meetings of that Committee.
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DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The trial court granted the respondent's motirm for
summary judgment, finding such payments to the Joint
Budget-Audit Committee to be unconstitutional.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The appellants seek reversal of the trial court's decision and a determination that Section 36-6-9, Utah Code
Annotated 1953, is constitutional.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The 37th Legislature for the State of Utah enacted
as Section 2 of Senate Bill No. 182 that which has been
codified as Section 36-6-9, Utah Code Annotated 1953. It
reads as follows :
"Members of the committee shall be paid a per
diem of $25 per day and shall be reimbursed for
actual and necessary expenses incurred while attending committee meetings."
Thereafter, the respondent commenced this action in his
official capacity as the Attorney General of the State of
Utah, contending that this Section was in violation of both
Sections 7 and 9 of Article VI of the Utah Constitution,
the result of which was the above-described decision of the
trial court.
ARGUMENT
POINT I.
WHEN CONSIDERING SECTION 36-6-9, UTAH
CODE ANNOTATED 1953, FOR POSSIBLE

CONSTITUTIONAL DEFECTS, ITS CONSTITUTIONALITY IS PRESUMED.
A fundamental preceprt regarding the constitutionality
of legislative acts is that such acts are presumed to be
valid and that all doubts should be resolved in favor of
constitutionality. No act should be declared unconstitutional unless it is clearly and palpably unconstitutional.
This principle has been long enunciated and followed in
decisions in this jurisdiction as well as elsewhere in the
United States. Highland Boy Gold Mining Co. v. Strickly,
et al., 28 Utah 215, 78 Pac. 296 (1904); Stillman, et al. v.
Lynch, 56 Utah 540, 192 Pac. 272 ( 1920); Tintic Standard
Mining Co. v. Utah County, 80 Utah 491, 18 P. 2d 633
(1932); Norville v. State Tax Commission, 98 Utah 170, 97
P. 2d 937 ( 1940); Parkinson v. Watson, 4 U. 2d 191, 291
P. 2d 400 (1955); Wood v. Budge, 13 U. 2d 359, 374 P. 2d
516 (1962); Great Salt Lake Authority v. Island Ranching
Co., 18 U. 2d 45, 414 P. 2d 963 (1966).
POINT II.
SECTION 2 OF SENATE BILL NO. 182 (CHAPTER 72, LAWS OF UTAH 1967) WHICH BECAME CODIFIED AS SECTION 36-6-9, UTAH
CODE ANNOTATED 1953, IS NOT IN VIOLATION OF THE PROVISIONS OF ARTICLE VI,
SECTION 7, OF THE UTAH CONSTITUTION.
Section 2 of Senate Bill No. 182 (Chapter 72, Laws
of Utah 1967) which became codified as Section 36-6-9,
Utah Code Annotated 1953, was enacted by the 37th Legislature to read as follows :
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"Members of the committee shall be paid a per
diem of $25 per day and shall be reimbursed for
actual and necessary expenses incurre<i wh:h attending committee meetings."
At that time Article Vi, Section 7, of the Utah Constitution read as follows :
"No member of the Legislature, during the
term for which he was elected, shall be appointed
or elected to any civil office of profit under this
State, which shall have been created, or the emoluments of which shall have been increased, during
the term for which he was elected."
A.

ARTICLE VI, SECTION 7, OF THE UTAH
CONSTITUTION PRESCRIBES CONSTITUTION AL DISQUALIFICATIONS FOR
OFFICE THAT ARE TO BE NARROWLY
CONSTRUED IN FAVOR OF ELIGIBILITY.

Utah is not unique in having a provision in its Constitution like Section 7 of Article VI, for nearly all of the
other states have almost identical provisions in their constitutions. One of the important questions posed by each
such provision is what public positions are within the
scope of the prohibition it contains. In its construction
there has arisen a general rule that provisions such as this
will be strictly construed and not extended beyond the
office named as being prohibited and further will be narrowly construed in favor of eligibility. Gragg v. Dudley,
143 Okla. 281, 289 Pac. 254 (1930); State ex rel. Johnson
v. Nye, 148 Wis. 659, 135 N. W. 126 (1912); Wallace v.
Grubb, 154 Tenn. 655, 289 S. W. 530 (1926); 118 A. L. R.
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182, rn4. If it were otherwise held, such provisions could
very well deny to members of any legi.slature the right to
·oerve on any inteJ"im committee it might create from time
to time. This would, in view of the ever greater usage of
interim committees in aid of legislation, serve to grossly
thwart the legislative process.
B.

A LEGISLATOR WHO MAY BE APPOINTED TO THE JOINT BUDGET-AUDIT
COMMITTEE IS NOT APPOINTED TO A
"CIVIL OFFICE OF PROFIT" UNDER ARTICLE VI, SECTION 7, OF THE UTAH
CONSTITUTION.

In many instances the moot important inquiries when
construing constitutional provisions like Article VI, Section 7, of the Utah Constitution have been as to whether
the prohibited office was created or the emoluments were
increased during the term of the legislator involved. This
is not so in this case, for here the critical question is
whether a legislator appointed to the Joint Budget-Audit
Committee was appointed to a "civil office of profit" as
contemplated by this Section. Many of the cases dealing
with this make distinctions between what is termed a mere
employment, which is allowed, and a public or civil office,
which is not. If the office involves a delegation of some
of the sovereign functiom of government to be exercised
for the public '"'elfare, then it is considered a public or civil
office and within the constitutional prohibition. In Re
Opinion of Justices, 3 l\Je. -181 (1822); State Tax Commis:oion v. Hrurin_qton. 126 :.vrd. Hi7, 94 A. 537 (1915); Baird
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Lefor, 52 N. D. 155, 201 N. W. 997 (1924); Curtin v.
State, 61 Cal. App. 377, 214 Pac. 1030 (1923); 53 A. L. R.
583, 602; 118 A. L. R. 182, 187.
V.

Of more precise definition as to what constitutes a
public or civil office under such constitutional provisions
is State ex rel. Barney v. Hawkins, 79 Mont. 506, 257 Pac.
411, 418 ( 1927) where the Montana Supreme Court stated
as follows:
" ... we hold that five elements are indispensable in any position of public employment, in order
to make it a public office of a civil nature: (1) It
must be created by the Constitution or by the Legislature or created by a municipality or other body
through authority conferred by the Legislature; (2)
it must possess a delegation of a po1tion of the
sovereign power of government, to be exercised for
the benefit of the public; ( 3) the powers conferred,
and the duties to be discharged, must be defined,
directly or impliedly, by the Legislature or through
legislative authority; ( 4) the duties must be performed independently and without control of a
superior power, other than the law, unless they be
those of an inferior or subordinate office, created
or authorized by the Legislature, and by it placed
under the general control of a superior officer or
body; ( 5) it must have some permanency and continuity, and not be only temporary or occasional."
At the time this decision was handed down, Section 7 of
Article V of the Montana Constitution read in part as
follows:
"No Senator or Representative ishall, during
the term for which he shall have been elected, be
appointed to any civil office under this state . . . "

7
Th 'Se requisites for an office to be characterized as a public or civil office under such constitutional provisions have
been adopted in other leading cases in the area. State ex
rel. Mcintosh v. Hutchinson, 187 Wash. 61, 59 P. 2d 1117
(1930); State ex rel. Hamblen v. Yelle, 29 Wash. 2d 68,
185 P. 2d 723 ( 1947); Oceanographic Commissi.-On v.
O'Brien,
Wash. _____ , 447 P. 2d 707 (1968). When
these cases were handed down, Article II, Section 13 of the
Washington Constitution read as follows:
"No member of the legislature, during the term
for which he is elected, shall be appointed or elected
to any civil office in the state, which shall have
been created, or the emoluments of which shall have
been increased, during the term for which he was
elected."
All of the five elements, these cases reiterate, must be
present for the office involved to achieve such stature, and
if any are miBsing, then it is not a civil or public office as
to which the constitutional disqualification applies.
An analysis of the basic duties and functions of the
Joint Budget-Audit Committee should be made, therefore,
to see if a member of this Committee p005sesses the requisites of a civil or public office. These duties and functions
are prescribed by Section 36-6-3, Utah Code Annotated
1953, which reads as follows:
"The duties and functions of the committee
shall be:
(1) To employ, without regard to political
affiliation, persons qualified for the positions of
legislative analyist and legislative auditor. To ap-
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prove the employment of other staff members recommended by the legislative analyst and by the
legislative auditor;
(2) To ascertain facts and make recommendations to the legislature concerning: (a) the management, operation, programs and fiscal needs of
the agencies and institutions of the state government; (b) the executive budget and the budget requests of each -state agenc.\· and institution, including proposals for construction of capital improvements; ( c) re\'en ue from existing and proposed
taxes and other sources; and (d) the state's fund
structure, financial condition, fiscal organization,
and its budgeting, accounting, reporting, personnel
and purchasing procedures;
(3) To keep minutes of its meetings which
shall be available to all members of the legislature
upon request, and to allow any membe1· of the legislature to attend any of the meetings of the committee and to present his \'iews on any subj ed which
the committee may be considering;

(4) To conduct such other activities as may
be required by law or by joint resolution of the legislature."
This is amplified by the provisiom; of Section 36-6-4, Utah
Code Annotated 1953, which reads in part as follows:
"The committee may administer oaths, issue
subpoenas, compel the attendance of witnesses and
the production of papers, books, accounts, documents, and testimony, and to have the deposition
of witnesses taken in the manner prescribed by the
Rules of Civil Procedure for taking of depositions
in civil actions. If a person disobeys or refuses to
comply with a subpoena, or if a witness refuse-3 to
testify to a matter regarding which he may be law-

fully intenogated, the district comt may on application of the committee compel obedience by proceedings for contempt in the same manner as in
the case of disobedience of the requirements of a
subpoena issued from the court or a refusal to testify in court ... "
Pursuant to the6e provi-sions, the Committee has directed
its activities towards consideration of budgetary and fiscal
matters of the State of Utah and the rendering of detailed
reports concerning them back to the Utah State Legislature, coupling this in instances with recommendations concerning legislation it felt needed in this sphere. It has no
power, however, to place these findings and recommendations into effect. Its duties and functions, therefore, are
restricted to that which is investigative and advisory.
If the five requisites set forth in State ex rel. Barney

v. Ha11·kins, supra, are applied to the Joint Budget-Audit
Committee and its members, it appears that they cannot
possibly fulfill very many of them. Of these, the first and
third requisite6 are ones that can probably be met: The
Committee was very assuredly created by the Utah State
Legislature, thus fulfilling the first; and its functions and
duties have been defined by this Legislature, thus fulfilling
the third requisite. There are grave doubts as to whether
the fourth and fifth requisite-s can be met: in that the
Committee works closely with the Legislature, being subject to its close control and supervision, and cannot for this
reason be said to possess the required independence; and
in the fact that the membership of the Committee is
changed every two years, at the end of every General
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Session of the Legislature, lacking, therefore, the continuity
and permanency required.
The second requisite, furthermore, appears to be an
even more insurmountable barrier to characterizing a member of the Joint Budget-Audit Committee as one occupying
a civil office of profit. It is whether the membership of
this Committee possess any delegation of the sovereign
power of government. For these members to have this
power they must be engaged in making Ia ws or in executing or administering the same. Of this particular requisite
the Washington Supreme Court has said:
"However broadly or particularly the term
sovereign power may be defined, it is certain that,
among other attributes, it embraces an exercise of
the government's inherent police power, which, in
turn, and by ordinary definition, extends to the
preservastion of the public health, safety, and morals
. . . " Oceanographic Commission v. O'Brien,
Wash. ______ , 447 P. 2d 707, 711 ( 1968).
With the Joint Budget-Audit Committee being restricted to
investigative and advisory functions, it cannot be said to
possess such delegaition of sovereign power.
While there appear to be no cases that deal precisely
with a legislative committee like the Joint Budget-Audit
Committee in the context of the constitutional disqualification provided for in Article VI, Section 7, of the Utah Constitution, there have been cases from various jurisdictions
that have held under similar constitutional prohibitions
that membership in various legislative committees was not
a public or civil office. This was the decision in State ex
rel. Hamblen v. Yrlle, supra, where membership in the
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legislative council of Washington was attacked upon these
coIIBtitutional grounds. The duties and functions of that
legislative council were almost identical in part with those
of the Joint Budget-Audit Committee, and there the Court
said:
"The council members will not legislate, execute, or administer laws enacted by them. The only
power of the legislative council is to collect information and report as to the facts it findis to the
next legislature and to make its reports public.
Since it is not engaged in making laws, executing
them, or administering them, no member of the
council is a holder of a public office ... " State ex
rel. Hamblen v. Ydle. 29 Wash. 2d 68, 76, 185 P.
2d 723, 728 (1947).
This was also the holding in another leading case involving
membership in a legislative council where the Montana
Supreme Court held that the members of this council had
not been appointed thereb>· to a civil office in contravention of Article \', Section 7, of the Montana Constitution
earlier <1uoted. State ex rel. James v. Aronson, 132 Mont.
120, 314 P. 2d 849 ( 1957). Here too some of the duties
and functions of this legislative council were very similar
to those of the Joint Budget-Audit Committee. Yet another case is Parker v. Riley, 18 Cal. 2d 83, 113 P. 2d 873
( 1941) in which the California Supreme Court held that
membership by legislators on a joint committee on interstate cooperation that the California State Legislature had
created by statute did not violate a more restrictive constitutional provision than Article VI, Section 7, of the Utah
Constitution. The California constitutional provision pro-
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hibited any legislator from accepting any office, trust. or
employment under that state, which was more restrictive
than the previous constitutional prnvision in California,
this former provision being very close to Section 7; and
membership on this committee, which was formed to further participation of that state in the council of :;tate governments and cooperation with other g<JYcrnments, was
determined as not being in violation of the then effective
constitutional prohibition. Thus, the appellant respectfully
submits that an appointment or election of a member of
the Utah State Legisl::tturc to the Joint Budget-Audit Committee is not an appointment or election to a "civil office
of profit" prohibited by Article VI, Section 7, of the Utah
Constitution.
POINT III.
SECTION 2 OF SENATE BILL NO. 182 (CHAPTER 72, LAWS OF UTAH 1967) WHICH BECAME CODIFIED AS SECTION 36-6-9, UT AH
CODE ANNOTATED 1953, DOES NOT INCREASE THE COMPENSATION OF LEGISLATORS APPOINTED TO THE JOINT BUDGETAUDIT COMMITTEE IN VIOLATION OF ARTICLE VI, SECTION 9, OF THE UTAH CONSTITUTION.
When Section 36-6-9, Utah Code Annotated 1953, was
enacterl in 1967, Article VI, Section 9, of the Utah Constitution read as follows :
"The members of the Legislature shall receiw
such compensation, not exceeding $GOO.OO a :-;ear
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for the legislative term and $5.00 a day expense<>
while actually in session, and mileage as provided
by law."
Prior to January 1, 1945, this Section 9 read as follows:
"The members of the Legislature shall receive
such per diem and mileage as the Legislature may
provide, not exceeding four dollars per day, and
ten cents per mile for the distance traveled going
to and returning from the place of meeting on the
most usual route, and they shall receive no other
pay or perquisite."
Between Janua1·:,· 1,
9 read a'S follows:

1~.15,

and Januan· 1, 1951, this Section

"The members of the Legislature shall receive
such compensation and mileage as the Legislature
may provide, not exceeding $300.00 per year, and
ten cents per mile for the distance traveled going
to and returning from the place of meeting in the
most usual route, and they shall receive no other
pay or perquisite."
Then on .Janua1·y 1, 1931, this Section 9 became what it
was when Section 3fi-6-9 wa·3 enacted. It should be noted
that both of the earlier \·ersions of this section of the Utah
\,onstitution l'itatl'd specificall:• that "they shall receive no
other

pa~·

or pen1uisite."

The deletion of this latter clause from Article VI, Section 9, of the Utah Constitution must be construed as purposeful and as such leads to some very important conclusions. A "perquisite" is normally defined as emoluments
or profits accruing to public officer beyond the salary
payable to him. It is an allowance that is paid in addition
to ordinary salar:-· or fixed wages for services rendered,
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an addition to fixed compensation. Ballentine's Law Dictionary, Third Edition, 939; 43 Am. Jur., Public Office1'S,
§ 059; County Auditors v. Anderson, 133 Pa. Super. 475,
3 A. 2d 28 ( 1938); State ex rel. Harbage v. Ferguson, 68
Ohio App. 189, 36 N. E. 2d 500 (1938). By this deletion
there ai·ises the very strong implication that restrictions
against certain types of remuneration for le~islators were
being removed and that some degree of extra pay or perquisite was being authorized in certain instances in addition to the compensation preci~ely set forth in Section 9.
This is made more apparent if this deletion is placed
into the context of the then (and now) ever-increasing
complexity of state government and the rise of interim
legislakive committees to act as fact-finders and to make
recommendations to the particular legislature to which
they were connected. These functions entailed on behalf of
the members of such eommittees considerable expenditure
of time and effort as well as out-of-pocket expense. The
services rendered in such interim tasks constitute extraordinary services, being in addition to those rendered during or incident to the sessions of the legislature involved.
It is only reasonable that legislators serving on these committees receive some modicum of compensation for their
extraordinary services rendered and expenses. It would
appear, moreover, that the electorate of Utah in 1944 and
again in 1949, in deleting- the prohibition against other
pay or perquisites for legislators, inten<le<l that where
members of the Utah State Legislature performed services
and incurred expenses for legislative purposes in addition
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to t110se during a session, such members should be compensated for this. Today the legislative process includes a
great deal of extra effort and expense between sessions of
the Legislature b~· the members of various interim committees, such as the Joint Budget-Audit Committee, the
membership M to which include only a portion of all the
legislators. To deny the members of these committees the
right to a small measure of compensation for their services in these capat:ities and their expenses seem grossly
unreasonable and \rnuld, most assuredly, serve to frustrate
the legislative process. It cc1iainly cannot be denied that
the framers of the Utah Constitution ancl those who by
vote sint:e then have changed it did not intend to frustrate
this process. The strong policy considerations for permitting payment of the very reasonable amounts provided for
in Section 36-6-9, Utah Corle Annotated 1953, are apparent
from one or tlw li1')"t recent Ptah cases involving Article
YI of the llt<>.h C1mstitution where this Court said:
''One of the principal merits of our system of
law anrl justice is that it does not function by casting reason aside and clinging slavishly to a literal
application of one single provi'Sion of law to the
exclusion of all others. Its policy is rather to follow
the path of reason in order to avoid arbitrary and
unjust results and to give recognition in the highest
possible degree to all of the rights assured by all
of the Constitutional provisions." Shields V. Toronto.
16 U. 2d 61, 63, 395 P. 2d 829, 830 ( 1964).
The principle of allowing remuneration for legi'Slators
serving on interim committees, such as the Joint BudgetAudit Committee, in excess of that provided in the consti-
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tu tional prov1s10ns covering compensation for legislators
is well established. Where new and additional duties are
imposed upon legislators by reason of their serving on
such commitJtees, it is only logical that they should receive
c:ompensation for same. This obtains even though the particular constitutional limitation upon their compensation
is coucl1ed in terms of denying their right to receive any
other compensation, pay, perquisite, or allowance, similar
to Article VI, Section 9 of the Utah Constitution as it exisrted prior to January 1, 1951. State ex rel. James v.
Aronson, supra; Spearman v. Williams, ______ Okla. ______ , 415
P. 2d 597 ( 1966). In the former case the Montana Supreme
Comit upheld as constitutional under such constitutional
limitation a payment for actual travel and other expenses
incurred by a member of the new legislative council created in that state. These expenses had been provided for
in the statute creating the council but were attacked a5
being in violation of Article V, Section 5 of the Montana
Constitution, which provided a per diem and mileage to
each member of the legislative assembly but stated that
they " ... shall receive no other compensation, perquisite,
or allowance whatsoever." In the latter case the Supreme
court of Oklahoma came out to a similar result where
members of that state's legislative council were to receive
cel'tain lump sums each month in lieu of expenses, this
being in addition to the compensation provided for legislators in Article 5, Section 21 of the Oklahoma Constitution.
This particular constitutional provision ended with " . . .
and shall receive no other compensation", and the court
found st:c!:l lump .~uns to be constih1tional. While both of
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thes, cases speak in terms of such payments not being additional compensation but rather reimbursement of actual
cash outlays incurred for serving on the particular legislative councils involved, implicit within the reasoning of both
these courts is that the members of the interim committee
should receive some modicum of remuneration for their
additional services and expenses. This is evident from
State ex rel. James v. Aronson, supra, where the court refers with approval to language from a previous Montana
case:
"It is a well-settled principle of law that a provision such as is contained in the Constitution of
this state, prohibiting any law diminishing the salary or emolument of a public officer after his
election or appointment, does not forbid the allowance of compensation for new and different services exacted from him during his term, where the
statute imposing the duties also prescribed the compensation for their performance." State ex reJ.
Donyes v. Commissioners. 23 Mont. 250, 253, 58
Pac. 439, 440 (1899).
With Article VI, Section 9, of the Utah Constitution
having been amended to delete the prohibition against a
legislator receiving any additional pay or perquisite, there
is an even stronger case for declaring the payments provided for in Section 36-6-9, Utah Code Annotated 1953, to
be valid. Thus, the appellant respectfully submits that the
payments provided for in Section 36-6-9 are constitutional
under Article VI, Section 9, of the Utah Constitution as it
existed when Section 36-6-9 was enacted in 1967.
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CONCLUSION
By way of summary then, Section 36-6-9, Utah Code
Annotated 1953, is valid and not in violation of either Section 7 or 9 of Article VI of the Utah Constitution for the
following reasons :
1. There is a strong presumption ai:s to the constitutionality of such legislation, and all doubts should be re-solved in favor of same.

2.

A legislator appointed to the Joint Budget-Audit

Committee is not appointed to a "civil office of profit" as
contemplated by Article VI, Section 7, of the Utah Constitution in that the requisites of such civil office simply cann~

be met by the members of this Committee.
3.

Section 36-6-9, Utah Code Annotated 1953, did not

increai:se the compensation of legislators appointed to the
Joint Budget-Audit Committee in violation of Article VI,
Section 9, of the Utah Constitution by reason of the fact
that this pal'ticular section of the Utah Constitution limits
only the compensation that legislators are to receive for
work performed during legislative sessions and does not
prohibit remuneration to legislators in respect to new and
additional duties impooed on them by reason of membership on an interim legislative committee like the Joint
Budget-Audit Committee.
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On the basis of the foregoing, it is respectfully submitted that 1lhe judgment of the lower court should be
reversed.
Respectfully submitted,

MELVIN E. LESLIE
Assistant Attorney General
318 State Capitol
Salt Lake City, Utah
Attorney for Appellants

